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Abstract 
The use of international peacebuilding as a delivery vehicle for preventing violent 
extremism (PVE) initiatives is a recent and pivotal development in United Nations 
(UN) counter-terrorism strategy. However, existing research has not considered the 
contradictions that emerge when international organizations transition to new 
peacebuilding approaches such as PVE. Further, it remains unclear whether and how 
intervening organizations overcome these contradictions. Based upon 47 interviews 
with UN, government, and NGO officials in Kyrgyzstan and New York this article 
critically analyses the shift to PVE as an underlying strategic approach to UN 
peacebuilding and the mismatch between external expectations and local priorities. 
Interview narratives feature ambiguity in conceptions of foundational PVE concepts 
and in how interveners reference a menu of drivers for violent extremism according to 
project requirements. This article argues that ambiguity is strategically tolerated and 
employed, whereby not clarifying the terms of engagement with (sub-)national 
counterparts supports external agendas and achieves a basic unity of purpose by 
permitting counterparts increased managerial latitude to satisfy self-interests. 
 
Keywords 




The UN’s strategy in the Central Asian nation of Kyrgyzstan exemplifies a recent 
transformation in the UN’s peacebuilding approach across the globe. In an apparent about-
face, the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in Kyrgyzstan has initiated a new $20.1m USD suite 
of multi-agency peacebuilding projects in 2018 that leaves behind the UN’s former focus on 
preventing the recurrence of interethnic violence in the country1 and adopts “preventing 
violent extremism” (PVE) as an underlying strategic approach moving forward.  This new 
suite of UN PBF projects purports to support the Kyrgyz government in curbing violent 
extremism by building the resilience of targeted local communities to radicalization, 
reforming justice and security institutions, and building the capacity of penitentiary, 
probation, police and forensic services.2 The UN system justifies this shift towards PVE as 
counteracting a “burgeoning phenomenon of radicalization and participation of 
[Kyrgyzstan’s] citizens in violent extremism”3 such as the alleged recruitment of Kyrgyz 
nationals to carry out attacks on the Ataturk international airport and a nightclub in Istanbul 
(Turkey) during 2016-17, China’s Embassy in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) in 2016, a metro 
carriage in St. Petersburg (Russia) in  2017, and Sweden, where suspects were arrested before 
a planned attack in 2018.4 Further, the Kyrgyz government claims that 803 citizens have 
travelled as foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, continue to return, and pose a serious challenge 
to social cohesion and stability in local communities across Kyrgyzstan.5  
                                                 
1 Contact: Chuck Thiessen, chuck.thiessen@coventry.ac.uk; chuck.thiessen@gmail.com, Assistant Professor, 
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, Coventry, Building 5 - Innovation Village, 
Cheetah Road, CV1 2TL, Coventry, UK. 
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The UN’s turn to PVE as a strategic peacebuilding approach reflects evolving UN 
priorities more broadly as outlined in the Secretary-General’s 2016 Plan of Action to Prevent 
Violent Extremism (PVE)6, and is exemplified by UN programming in Kyrgyzstan and in at 
least 46 other countries (by 2017).7 In addition to the UN’s expanding attention to PVE, 
similar shifts in intervention approaches are occurring within other international 
organisations. As an example, the European Union (EU) doubled its investments in PVE and 
counter-terrorism between 2015 (€138m) and 2017 (€274m) to target over 40 countries.8 
Further, UN and EU PVE projects often coexist with analogous initiatives supported by the 
UK Conflict Stability and Security Fund, United States Department of State, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and an array of international and local 
NGOs.9  
The expanding use of international peacebuilding as a delivery vehicle for PVE is a 
pivotal development inside the UN’s counter-terrorism strategy. However, existing research 
has not considered how this strategic transition plays out at the country level. Given the 
newness of this, it is unsurprising that there is a distinct gap in the literature base in relation 
to whether and why the PVE turn looks different at the country level than originally 
conceived at the strategic level within UN Headquarters. In response, this article adopts two 
lines of inquiry that extend beyond the bounds of the UN system and implicate other 
international organizations that are also transitioning to a PVE approach: 1) What explains 
the contradictions that emerge when international organizations (including the UN) transition 
to new peacebuilding approaches such as PVE? 2) How do these organizations overcome 
these contradictions and rectify mismatches between external expectations and local 
priorities? These questions address a blind spot in scholarly attention to PVE so far – the 
broader implications of contradictions within the UN’s PVE approach for the success of PVE 
initiatives. These lines of inquiry are pursued in conversation with peacebuilding leaders 
connected to UN PVE projects at multiple levels – who identify the defining features of a 
PVE approach to peacebuilding10 and analyse the strategic nature of the implementation of 
the PVE turn in UN peacebuilding. 
These lines of inquiry are original and important in the context of existing research 
literature and methods of UN research. A review of the literature revealed that, to date, there 
have not been any empirical studies analysing how the UN has transitioned to a PVE 
approach at the country-level. Indeed, there has not been any substantive scholarly research 
that allows those with a clearest view of country-level transition processes - UN officials and 
their government counterparts themselves – to directly shape emerging theory on UN PVE 
peacebuilding. Methodologically, this research pushes out from all too common top-down 
perspectives and features insider perspectives at multiple levels to more fully illuminate how 
and why external PVE agendas are accepted, revised or rejected as they drop down from 
Headquarters to local communities. 
This article proceeds by contextualizing the UN’s pivot towards PVE in Kyrgyzstan 
and elsewhere and situates this pivot in the existing international peacebuilding research 
literature. Next, the methodological framework used in this research is detailed and justified, 
including core research questions and the methods of gathering and analysing data from 47 
UN, government, and NGO officials in Kyrgyzstan and at UN headquarters in New York. 
Then, research findings are presented, with the final discussion section interpreting these 
findings with the construction of a grounded theory of UN PVE strategy. 
 
The United Nations and PVE in Kyrgyzstan 
The social and political transition of Kyrgyzstan after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union is signposted by two major civil uprisings.11 The 2005 Tulip Revolution removed the 
country’s first president and a rebellion in April 2010 deposed his successor - Kurmanbek 
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Bakiyev. Following Bakiyev’s removal the Kyrgyz transitional government struggled to 
stabilize Kyrgyz society and politics and inter-ethnic clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 
2010 killed 400-500 people, displaced hundreds of thousands internally and externally, and 
resulted in major damage to property.12 Southern Kyrgyzstan borders Uzbekistan, and is 
home to a significant Uzbek population - Kyrgyzstan’s largest ethnic minority.13 These 
clashes were provoked by perceived social and economic inequalities, political exclusion of 
ethnic minorities, and divisive competitions for power by local leaders in southern regions 
and cities.14 Deep ethnic and regional divisions have lingered since the June 2010 events and 
southern Kyrgyz society is still characterized by social segregation and mistrust for local and 
central governments, justice structures and law enforcement. 
As a constituent component to a broader international response to the June 2010 
events, the UN system, through its Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), implemented a suite of 
projects during 2010-17 that worked to prevent a relapse into violent conflict by reforming 
the police, the justice system, national and local governance structures in order to reconstruct 
its citizens’ trust, support local dispute resolution and persuade youth, civil society, religious 
leaders and national media outlets to improve ethnic relations.15 However, as PBF projects 
were implemented three social trends became increasingly visible. First, the years after 2010 
did not heal disaffected Uzbek populations. Uzbeks continue to feel disenfranchised and 
believe that the national government has unfairly sided with the ethnic Kyrgyz majority.16 
Second, prolific online propaganda reveals that several groups with ideologies labelled as 
“extremist” by the Kyrgyz government are active in Kyrgyzstan, with some actively 
recruiting foreign fighters to travel to Syria and Iraq and carry out terrorist attacks.17 Third, it 
is commonly perceived in Kyrgyzstan that both Uzbek and Kyrgyz populations are becoming 
more conservative in religious beliefs and practices.18 In response to these trends, the general 
public and government officials have embraced a narrative of heightened threats for violent 
extremism and terrorism in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz government authorities claim that 803 
citizens of Kyrgyzstan have travelled as foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq to fight with ISIS 
and other armed groups. Some of these fighters continue to return home – in turn providing 
significant challenges for Kyrgyz authorities.19 Furthermore, there are numerous examples of 
international terrorist attacks committed by citizens of Kyrgyzstan or by individuals who 
have spent significant time in the country. In most cases, perpetrators are allegedly from the 
minority Uzbek population. But it is important to note here that the actual relationship 
between Islamic piety and extremist violence is deeply contested. For example, Heathershaw 
and Montgomery20 argue that it is, in fact, security analysts who have constructed and 
perpetuated an international security discourse of Muslim radicalization that erroneously 
links ‘extremist’ violence to non-violent forms of political Islam and to public expressions of 
piety.  
In response, the UN system has decided to re-direct its PBF-funded peacebuilding 
programme in Kyrgyzstan and adopt PVE as its strategic peacebuilding approach inside its 
broader “sustaining peace” initiative in the country.21 As part of a growing divergence with 
traditional UN peacebuilding approaches, 22 UN peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan are 
now distinctly focused on building community resilience to radicalization and extremist 
ideologies, including those exploiting religion. UN PVE programming is equipping state 
authorities to align their PVE policy actions with international human rights standards and 
building the capacity of law enforcement and the judiciary accordingly, as well as including 
women in the national security architecture. UN projects are also supporting the reform of 
Kyrgyzstan’s forensic services, the prison system and prisoner rehabilitation services. 
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External Agendas and the UN’s Peacebuilding Pivot to PVE 
In order to complete the lines of inquiry set out above, it is necessary to explore the 
UN’s peacebuilding pivot to PVE in relation to the growing critique of Western and UN 
interventionism in conflict zones.23 Of interest here is the critique’s assertion that 
international peacebuilding interventions are substantially driven by external agendas.24 This 
critique argues that international peacebuilding in conflict zones is often legitimated by 
claiming the universality and superiority of liberal economic, political and social norms, 
whereby external interveners assert foreign agendas in local societies.25 This agenda-driven 
dissemination of rules and norms has, predictably, not been a hands-off affair but has been 
enabled by Western-led “humanitarian wars” in places such as Kosovo, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Mali.26 These humanitarian wars have laid the foundation for 
more closely integrating the priorities of peacebuilding and counter-terrorism in regions like 
Central Asia, the Sahel and across the globe.27 
But UN peacebuilding priorities are also closely aligned with member state agendas in 
conflict zones. As is becoming clear here, this alignment is contradictory. The UN 
peacebuilding architecture is directed by member state mandates through financial 
contributions and, thus, the system listens closely to the requests of wealthier states – 
primarily industrialized liberal democracies, but also aspirants such as China and Russia, who 
are able to commit more resources and are interested in UN strategies in regions such as 
Central Asia.28 Conversely, the UN system is a critical friend to member states – exerting 
normative influence in governance reform, economic reform, development policy, and 
standardizing human rights. This positionality is evidently contradictory since the UN system 
rhetorically promotes the separation of politics and project initiatives while, at the same time, 
pivoting towards politicized counter-terrorism and PVE approaches that align the UN system 
more fully to the political agendas of member states.29 
UN alignment with member state political agendas, especially state interests in 
clearing “terrorist” and “extremist” threats, and concomitant cooperation with military 
interventions to this end,30 has served to politicize and securitize UN external peacebuilding 
intervention in conflict zones. The deepening politicization of the UN’s approach at multiple 
levels allows the UN system to maintain its sway in global governance to both regulate the 
behaviours of conflict populations and transform local politics, society and economics 
therein.31 An exploration of the politicization of peacebuilding leads directly to an even 
deeper critique – that the UN system has permitted the securitization of its peacebuilding 
work inside counter-terrorism and PVE initiatives as they serve the security agenda of 
intervening member states.32 In this way, the PVE approach to peacebuilding allows 
international interveners to project local radicalization and related conflict as international 
security concerns in order to justify deeper forms of external influence in conflict zones.33 
The securitization of peacebuilding has required the continuous fine-tuning of 
intervention approaches to gain access to conflict-affected populations and legitimate 
intervention. For example, liberal peacebuilders have and continue to invoke the human 
security discourse, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine34 and resilience building35 to 
counteract accusations of neo-colonialism. However, scholars have problematized human 
security, R2P and resilience-building and pointed out that each are utilized for far more than 
alleviating local insecurity in conflict zones and legitimate deeper forms of intervention while 
supporting external agendas.36 This article considers if the emerging PVE approach can also 
be viewed as but the latest iteration to better enable interveners to bolster their influence and 
security. 
However, the satisfaction of external agendas requires support from member state 
governments, and strategic compromises are made to ensure that national governments 
support foreign agendas as they look after their own. Compromises create difficult dilemmas 
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for the UN – especially when cooperating with undemocratic state counterparts. UN-state 
cooperation is typically initiated by invitations from states and is, thus, conditional on 
continued state support. Consequently, member states can significantly shape UN PVE 
initiatives and can insist upon forms of intervention that are dissonant with UN human rights 
norms. For example, states may insist upon labelling their armed and unarmed political 
opponents “violent extremists” or “terrorists” to repress legitimate resistance and critique of 
their governance. Ucko clarifies this tendency: “By characterizing dissenting domestic groups 
as violent extremists, these states could present as PVE, and thereby legitimize, any measure 
taken to stem such groups’ recruitment, messaging or outreach.”37 Thus, UN PVE measures 
may, indirectly and ironically, motivate radicalization towards violent extremism38 as state 
authorities enact exclusionary policies and suppress segments of their constituency.39 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon affirmed this correlation to the UN General Assembly in 
2016: “Poisonous ideologies do not emerge from thin air. Oppression, corruption and 
injustice are greenhouses for resentment. Extremists are adept at cultivating alienation.”40 
The UN’s expanding attention to violent extremism has enjoyed uncommon levels of 
support from within the UN member-state community - resulting in an extensive hydra-
headed corpus of UN entities and programs that work on counter-terrorism and, 
concomitantly, PVE. The UN’s tentacular counter-terrorism architecture features Security 
Council subsidiary organs including the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its 
Executive Directorate (CTED), and General Assembly organs including its Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), all of which are governed by the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS).41 In 2017 the Secretary General created the Office of 
Counter-Terrorism (OCT) to oversee all but the Security Council’s work in this area.42  
However, the UN counter-terrorism architecture is waking up to an important 
contradiction – member states supported by UN counter-terrorism initiatives have sometimes 
rolled back human rights of regular citizens as part of counter-terrorism initiatives. In fact, 
regressions in human rights are often cancelling out any gains in security through counter-
terrorist ventures. This contradiction of UN counter-terrorism has motivated a reaction 
against hard-power kinetic counter-terrorism measures - the paradigmatic turn to PVE inside 
UN peacebuilding measures. This strategic turn required the UN to relabel and reorient its 
peacebuilding initiatives to feature preventative action targeting the drivers of radicalization 
leading to extremism and terrorism. For example, the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund has 
embraced PVE-specific programming in several of its country engagements including 
Kyrgyzstan and across the Sahel. The UN’s pivot to PVE dovetails with the UN’s “sustaining 
peace” agenda and its focus on prevention43 since PVE favours preventative over reactionary 
responses – suggesting that improved governance and protecting human rights will reduce the 
odds of extremist violence.44 
The embrace of PVE is strategic at the highest levels in the UN system as evident in 
the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy45 and the Secretary-General’s 2016 Plan of 
Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE).46 The Plan of Action explicitly and 
comprehensively adopts a preventative stance to extremist violence and terrorism as it 
prioritizes systematic action to confront undergirding issues that are driving individuals and 
groups to commit extremist violence.47 The Plan of Action comprehensively shapes UN 
strategy across the globe by injecting ongoing security, political, humanitarian, and 
development initiatives with the logic of PVE and, in doing so, connects a wide range of 
social, political and economic challenges to the issue of extremist violence.48 
UN PVE initiatives have provoked the formation of numerous governmental and non-
governmental national, regional and international networks and consortiums to adopt the 
underlying logic of PVE and revise their work accordingly – often reinforced through donor 
funding. At the state level, numerous countries including Kyrgyzstan have responded to the 
Accepted for publication in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 15 July 2019 
Plan of Action and created a national strategy for PVE and drafted new laws and policies. 
Non-state activity is even more energetic - in the small country of Kyrgyzstan alone over 30 
PVE projects operate outside of the UN system49 – often implemented by international 
organizations together with local NGOs.50 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
This research adopts a qualitative grounded theory research approach and relies upon 
the insights of those working in or closely with the UN system at the global level at UN 
Headquarters in New York and the national and sub-national levels in Bishkek and Osh, 
Kyrgyzstan. The primary case study for this research, Kyrgyzstan, is a convenient location to 
investigate UN peacebuilding trends since the country’s relatively small land area and 
population allows a wide range of respondents to make informed comments on the overall 
country engagement. UN officials in New York complement Kyrgyzstan respondents by 
adding a global perspective to compare Kyrgyzstan to other country engagements. Data was 
gathered during 2017-18, a period of transition for the UN engagement in Kyrgyzstan where 
the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund decisively shifted its underlying peacebuilding strategy to PVE 
as part of its overarching “sustaining peace” approach. Thus, the timing of data gathering 
allowed insights into a portion of the UN project cycle that is rarely observed at the field 
level by academic researchers – the transitional period during which new peacebuilding 
projects are debated, negotiated, and agreed upon. This period featured the tension and 
uncertainty of transition, and memories of difficult debates regarding the PVE approach were 
fresh in the minds of respondents. 
As mentioned earlier, this research explores the transition to and defining features of a 
PVE approach to peacebuilding and analyses the strategic nature of the implementation of 
PVE in UN peacebuilding. To empirically explore these core concerns, interview questioning 
focused on the strategic shift towards a PVE approach to projects at multiple levels and the 
most important contextual factors and stakeholders that determine if these projects effectively 
influence government counterparts and local populations. 
Data Gathering 
Data was gathered through face-to-face in-depth semi-structured interviews with 47 
key informants (24 women, 23 men) – 19 interviews within the UN system, seven interviews 
with Kyrgyz government counterpart institutions and six interviews with civil society 
implementing partners in Kyrgyzstan. Forty-two respondents worked in Bishkek and Osh and 
five respondents were senior peacebuilding, counter-terrorism, and PVE officials at UN 
Headquarters in New York. Access to respondents at multiple levels in Kyrgyzstan and New 
York was facilited by the author’s multi-year work as a research consultant guiding baseline 
and endline assessments of peacebuilding projects across Kyrgyzstan. 
Interview sampling was purposive and aimed at significant variation to capture a rich 
cross section of opinions and was guided by key inclusion criteria including the type of 
organization, position in the organization, location, experience with PVE, and gender. 
Sampling was also theoretical – some respondents were selected according to gaps in the 
interview narratives to flesh out the argument presented in this article. Most interviews were 
audio recorded with the remaining documented in detailed notes. In addition to interviews, a 
“learning history” process of reflection in the form of a collaborative workshop51 was held in 
Bishkek during which 16 UN and NGO representatives validated initial interpretations of 
interview data and provided further insights from their personal and institutional experiences. 
Interview and learning history data were supplemented by secondary documentary sources 
including research reports and project evaluations. 
Accepted for publication in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 15 July 2019 
Data Analysis and Presentation 
Data analysis was instructed by a constructivist approach to grounded theory that 
featured strongly the voices of respondents in the presentation of findings and allowed 
respondents to describe for themselves their understanding of morphing UN peacebuilding. A 
process of ‘focused coding’ the interview narratives and notes established core explanatory 
categories.52 More selective open coding then populated core categories. In the presentation 
of findings, categories with the highest number of references in the coded data are featured 
while less salient categories nuanced major categories. 
Research findings are discussed through the construction of a grounded theory that 
structures emerging insights regarding the UN’s PVE peacebuilding approach.53 Theory 
generation is grounded in the experiences and perceptions of practitioners who are designing 
and implementing PVE programming and provide insights not available through official 
communication or in published documents.54 This grounded theory links these insights with 
existing theory and official viewpoints and reveals the broader implications of this research 
for PVE approaches across the globe.55 A grounded theory approach has also influenced how 
the argument in this article is assembled – the theoretical background was constructed after 
data analysis was completed so that theory responded to the findings. 
 
Findings 
The findings of this research are presented in two parts, beginning with the conceptual 
and definitional ambiguity of the PVE turn and followed by the ambiguity of legitimizing a 
menu of drivers of violent extremism to justify UN PVE projects. 
Conceptual and Definitional Ambiguity 
UN, government, and non-governmental PVE officials perceive the peacebuilding 
pivot to PVE as replete with conceptual and definitional ambiguity. A strong majority of 
respondents, at multiple levels, highlighted variability inside project development processes 
in how key themes in the PVE turn are understood and believed UN agencies and their 
government counterparts were unprepared to engage with this disunity. Two examples 
emerged from the interview narratives that highlighted dissonance between UN respondents 
and their government counterparts. First, the term “radicalization” is conceived of in 
dissonant ways, especially regarding the significance granted to religion and religious issues 
when conceptualizing Islamic radicalization. To summarize, UN respondents often restricted 
their interview discourses to either omit references to Islamic radicalization or approached the 
topic discreetly while their government counterparts regularly and openly expressed a 
concern that conservative Islamic religiosity in Kyrgyzstan was associated with radicalization 
towards violence. A senior UN project manager stated, “For example, [anonymized UN 
agency] will not accept the term “religious radicalisation", never ever, because they think this 
is the stigmatization of particular group or a particular religion”, while another UN official in 
Bishkek contrasted the government, “When we talk about radicalisation with the government, 
they clearly understand this as a religious issue, so they always put religious nuance into the 
context.” This ambiguity is played out inside government policy – another UN official 
explained how government policy revisions fixated on religious issues while their UN 
sponsors were consistently more hesitant to conceive of radicalization in this manner. 
Disagreement over whether radicalization in Kyrgyzstan is fundamentally a religious 
phenomenon occurs inside the UN system as well. A senior UN official commented, 
“…sometimes I use this terminology and then [anonymized UN agency] rejects it saying, 
‘Don't use religious extremism’, it stigmatizes extremism [with] religion.” Her comments 
expose continuing uncertainty within the UN system about how to engage with religious 
actors and themes. For example, a UN senior advisor in Kyrgyzstan described controversy 
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over whether the UN should fund religious schooling – paying moderate Imams to counter 
extremist messages. A UN official in New York concurred, “Religion - and Islam particularly 
- it is a much more taboo subject.” 
A second case of definitional ambiguity concerns the target of UN and government 
PVE attention – is it “extremism” or “violent extremism”? Numerous UN, government and 
NGO respondents shared that the term “violent extremism” is rejected by government project 
partners as a tautology, who insist that extremism is inherently violent and cannot be divided 
into violent and non-violent types. A UN security official in Kyrgyzstan explained that 
Kyrgyz legislation does not use the term “violent extremism”: 
… the representatives of the government explained that the word “extremism” itself 
includes the understanding of violence, in general. And [Kyrgyz] legislation says that 
if the person is extremist it already means that it is not good - violence is part of the 
word “extremism.” 
In other words, holding extremist beliefs, on its own, has violent connotations and, according 
to some respondents, indicates the active recruitment of others to radical ideologies and the 
violence they promote. Conditioning extremism with “violent” was widely viewed as 
externally directed and illegitimate in the local context. Thus, keeping in mind the 
government’s fixation on religious radicalization, holding extreme religious beliefs, by itself, 
justifies surveillance and arrest. A UN project leader from Osh shared about religious 
scholars who were unfairly accused of links to ISIS and jailed without due process for 
possessing an “extremist” leaflet. He described the disarray of forensics processes whereby 
linguists and religious experts are commissioned but unprepared to determine the “extremity” 
of religious literature, complicated by the fact that literature is sometimes written in an 
unfamiliar language such as Arabic. 
To contrast, UN respondents were more likely to frame their engagement with 
extremism in terms of human rights and were much more tentative in judging beliefs held in 
confidence by Kyrgyz citizens as inherently violent.56 Many of these respondents argued that 
a person shown to be “extremist” based upon their choice of beliefs should not be coerced to 
change or incarcerated. Part of the dissonance stems from issues of translation - an NGO 
project leader argued that key terminology did not translate well between English and 
Russian, the working language in Kyrgyzstan. He explained that the Russian translation for 
“radical” is “…inherently violent…radicals are already thinking about violent actions.” 
The above two examples of ambiguity are not without consequences since both 
international and national government interveners shape their responses to extremist beliefs 
and violence accordingly, and possibly at odds with each other. For example, the UN and its 
government counterparts are not agreeing on whether intervention in local communities 
should be coercing the viewpoints of citizens in areas that are outside the “norm”. Are 
citizens free to hold the beliefs they choose? Can citizens expect to be free of surveillance 
and police pressure if their “extremist” beliefs do not result in violent action?  
Ambiguity Regarding the Drivers of Violent Extremism 
A second cluster of results contribute to a deeper understanding of how PVE 
practitioners and government officials theorize the UN’s peacebuilding pivot to PVE. 
Respondents were noticeably ambiguous about the drivers of violent extremism they deemed 
relevant for their interventions. 57 At the heart of the argument in this section is the 
observation that interveners have, for whatever reason, preserved a menu of drivers that is 
referenced to justify their PVE project designs. As per the theoretical background above, it is 
important to consider how this menu of drivers interacts with external agendas and the self-
interests of national government actors. Two salient drivers in the interview narratives are 
featured here – the correlations of violent extremism with either ethnic discord or 
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conservative Islamic religiosity. The goal here is not to assess the validity of these two 
proposed drivers but to explore how their promotion as constituent components to an 
ambiguous menu of drivers affords political opportunity and supports external agendas and 
self-interests. 
First, respondents grappled with whether the political, economic, and social 
marginalization of minority Uzbek populations in southern Kyrgyzstan are motivating violent 
extremism. The way government and non-government respondents engaged with this 
perceived driver diverged significantly - most non-government respondents actively 
discussed the correlation between ethnic discord and radicalization while most government 
respondents refused. A UN senior official noted government reluctance: “Frankly speaking, I 
believe that there is State unwillingness to recognize how much the violent extremism is 
driven by ethnic unresolved issues.” Conversely, she argued that disenfranchised populations 
may be more vulnerable to extremist organizations and the radical ideas they proffer. 
Here the perception of minority and ethnic rights is very limited. It is not a 
coincidence that the majority of foreign fighters or people radicalized are of a certain 
ethnic minority. I think there is a connection.  
Other respondents explained how discordant minority politics leads to extremist 
violence and foreign fighting. Structural disparities are paramount in their explanations. One 
UN project officer linked minority discord to unresolved issues after the 2010 ethnic violence 
and postulated that foreign fighter recruiters now exploited this discord: 
… [ethnic discord] can be linked to dissatisfaction or frustration of people that they 
don't see the justice in the country, they see corruption in the country, they don't 
believe that the government provides any assistance to them, and then they come with 
own rhetorics about building the faith society, where people will live with accordance 
of the Quran. 
Similarly, other respondents blamed ongoing discrimination of ethnic minorities, social 
inequality, disparities in justice services, minority exclusion from the police and military, and 
inferior government service provision in minority areas. Further, respondents also linked 
ethnic disparity to other drivers for violent extremism. A UN official from Osh noted the 
influence of radical groups on Uzbek economic migrants in Russia. Many citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan who fought with ISIS in Syria and Iraq first travelled as migrant workers to 
Russia. Once there, migrants are sometimes stigmatized, drawn into recruitment networks 
and, without the support of their family and social networks, convinced to join militant 
groups.58 
A second proposed driver deserves attention - the correlation between conservative 
religiosity and violent extremism.59 Once again perspectives of UN respondents were out of 
sync with their government counterparts. Bishkek-based UN respondents were generally 
careful to explain that “radical” religious beliefs do not, in most cases, result in violence. One 
UN project official argued that radicalization should be delinked from religion. Contrarily, 
government respondents consistently referred to how conservative religion was a driver for 
violent extremism and insecurity. For example, several government respondents raised the 
issue of religious education and whether the State should certify the content and methods of 
religious schooling to counteract fears that foreign-trained religious teachers are promoting 
doctrines that do not align with the religious traditions of Kyrgyzstan. 
Respondents in New York argued that disagreement regarding the correlation between 
religion and violent extremism occurs at the highest levels in the UN system, and is reflected 
in the development of the UN’s PVE Plan of Action.60 Similarly, Ucko observes that the Plan 
did not provide clear-cut definitions for violent extremism but rather pointed to examples of 
groups that self-identify as Islamic including Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State.61 
Numerous Muslim countries including members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
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felt unfairly singled out by this and pushed the UN system to detach Islam from the 
development of PVE policy62 – the results of which continue to be interpreted in varying 
ways in contexts like Kyrgyzstan. 
Respondents also linked conservative Islamic religiosity to other drivers of violent 
extremism on their menu of explanations as to what drives violent extremism. Conservative 
religiosity is linked to the phenomenon of political marginalization and resistance. The 
political marginalization of minority groups was regularly referenced by respondents, as was 
the 2017 UNDP report Journey to Extremism in Africa that evidenced how political 
grievances propelled individuals in Africa toward the tipping point of joining militant 
groups.63 Further, several respondents argued that targeting religiosity may mask the 
suppression of political resistance whereby governments suppress legitimate political protest 
in the name of thwarting religious extremism. 
 
Discussion – Toward a Grounded Theory of Strategic Ambiguity 
The research findings presented above respond to this article’s first line of inquiry and 
contribute to a better understanding of the important contradictions that emerge inside the 
peacebuilding pivot towards PVE. Interview narratives with peacebuilding practitioners 
reveal that contradictions inside the PVE turn are directly related to the turn’s inherent 
ambiguity. These practitioners described ambiguity in two areas – essential concepts and 
terminology are differentially understood and interpreted; and practitioners refer to an entire 
menu of drivers for violent extremism that are each, in themselves, contested and open to 
competing interpretations. The remaining step is to resolve this article’s second line of 
inquiry – how are the contradictions of ambiguity rectified as external expectations for PVE 
clash with local priorities? In response, this section argues that ambiguity is strategically 
tolerated and employed to facilitate the UN’s peacebuilding pivot towards PVE. This 
argument is presented as a grounded theory of strategic ambiguity in UN PVE strategy that 
serves as an analytical framework for understanding ambiguity in relation to external 
intervention agendas. This grounded theory is developed by integrating the findings of this 
research with existing research and theory in other sectors of external intervention in conflict 
zones. 
Before moving further, it is important to differentiate between ambiguity and 
uncertainty.64 Uncertainty reveals limits to information and can be reduced with superior and 
more information.65 Conversely, ambiguity implies a special case of uncertainty where 
multiple legitimate ways to frame, or interpret, a problem exist simultaneously.66 Thus, the 
concept of ambiguity underlines the importance of interpretation in determining the actions of 
intervening organizations and their leaders.67 Inside the PVE programme in Kyrgyzstan, both 
external interveners and their state counterparts frame the problem of extremism according to 
their respective values and agendas. The resulting divergence of frames is important since 
each frame points to contrasting solutions.68 For example, the UN system has formulated a 
PVE strategy in its Plan of Action and has operationalized this Plan through peacebuilding 
approaches in countries like Kyrgyzstan. However, these institutional approaches remain 
open to interpretation at multiple levels and differentially acted upon across the system.69  
This section argues that the ambiguity identified by respondents is not needing a fix 
but is, in fact, strategic and allergic to clarification. Ambiguity has often been conceived of as 
begging correction.70 However, if conceived of as strategic in nature, peacebuilding 
interveners will, in fact, continue to eschew efforts to clarify terminology, avoid rallying 
around a unified set of interests, and insist upon significant managerial latitude at the local 
level. External hierarchical influence over subordinate stakeholders is enacted through a 
tension between external desires to control counterparts and their desire for stakeholder input 
and collaboration.71 Coercing stakeholders to cooperate through hard power projection is 
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inadvisable since it precludes local ownership.72 Thus, external organizations resort to more 
subtle methods to creatively manage stakeholder subordinates. But the subtle and strategic 
use of ambiguity is unlikely to be explicitly justified in institutional policy documents, 
making it difficult to pin down. 
Even though not acknowledged in the official reports and communication of 
international peacebuilding institutions including the UN, there is precedent for the 
suggestion that ambiguity is strategically employed by external organizations to influence 
associated stakeholder groups.73  Barnett et al. argue that peacebuilding is a fundamentally 
ambiguous practice. Even though committed according to the UN’s Agenda for Peace plan of 
post-conflict peacebuilding, the diverse constituency of peacebuilding actors typical in most 
conflict zones conceive of and operationalize their core mandates in a highly diverse 
manner.74 This diversity of approaches suggests that the term “peacebuilding” serves as a 
political symbol, employed to facilitate collective action by a diversiform intervention 
community.75 As a more specific example, Best’s study of the economic and policy 
interventions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over several decades reveals far more 
than the persistence of unintended ambiguity in relation to policy interventions but, rather, 
the IMF’s strategic use of ambiguous regulations and guidelines to further its goals.76 
Similarly, the employment of strategic ambiguity serves the UN’s pivot to PVE agendas in 
Kyrgyzstan as explicated in the grounded theory developed in the remainder of this section. 
Navigating Complexity and Building Operational Support 
Strategic ambiguity allows international organizations to better navigate the dynamic 
social and political systems inside complex conflict zones.77 Peacebuilding inside complex 
operational environments cannot rely upon generalized rules that guarantee specific local 
reactions to external intervention and, thus, it is often difficult to predict what peacebuilding 
intervention is actually aiming at. Thus, strategic peacebuilding inside complex environments 
can benefit from loosely defined intervention objectives to legitimize elastic approaches on 
the journey towards unknowable endpoints.78 For example, ambiguity allows the UN to 
bolster its legitimacy even when adopting new peacebuilding approaches midstream in 
response to evolving social trends in Kyrgyzstan. 
The peacebuilding pivot to PVE in Kyrgyzstan has benefited from the UN’s 
employment of strategic ambiguity to build consensus and operational support for its agendas 
from a diversity of partners. Strategic ambiguity permits the UN’s implementing partners to 
interpret and re-cast UN directives according to self-interests and hasten their support. 
Ambiguous communication to national counterparts promotes unified diversity as it gathers 
dissonant groups with competing policy interests and facilitates agreement on abstractions 
while minimizing the restrictions of precise interpretations.79 In this research, unity in 
diversity is aided by legitimating and utilizing an unofficial menu of drivers for violent 
extremism, as a sort of sectoral folk wisdom, that affords intervention actors the managerial 
latitude to conveniently select target drivers that do not disturb their institutional mandates 
when securing donor funding and external support. This convenience helps explain why some 
discredited drivers such as poverty and low levels of education are so difficult to leave 
behind. As another example, exploiting ambiguous concepts such as “radicalization” and 
“extremism” plays on basic fears in local society and motivates support across varied 
ideological perspectives. UN ambiguity permits it to not question the Kyrgyz government and 
majority society about the constructed nature of the threat of Islamic extremism – potentially 
making the UN complicit in deepened government control over minority populations who are 
choosing to be pious. Conversely, precision in international objectives and communication 
may spark tension since clarity can threaten and drive away local counterparts. This selective 
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suspension of clarity is evident in the UN’s willingness to work closely with government 
counterparts despite competing conceptions of foundational PVE terminology in Kyrgyzstan. 
Fulfilling External Agendas and Partner Self-interests 
The strategic use of ambiguity bolsters international influence with national 
counterparts when new policies and approaches to intervention are introduced, as with the 
UN’s pivot to PVE.80 International organizations reduce the inherent disadvantages of being 
outsiders by ensuring their external agendas are supported by influential national 
counterparts. But ensuring national level support is by no means certain. The external 
agendas of the UN’s largest donors that have motivated the PVE turn include defeating ISIS, 
stymieing international terrorism and curbing migration to Europe do not have immediate and 
dire applicability to countries like Kyrgyzstan. Thus, UN external control is conditioned upon 
making sure PVE initiatives also satisfy member state agendas such as suppressing both 
extremist group influence and political resistance in Kyrgyzstan. 
Davenport and Leitch argue that external strategic management is realized through 
“circuits of power” between external organizations and their counterparts, whereby powerful 
organizations grant managerial latitude to stakeholders using strategic ambiguity to both 
increase its own power and, at the same time, empower these stakeholders.81 The Kyrgyz 
government benefits from the UN’s willingness to maintain an environment where the 
government can interpret key terminology and drivers in a self-serving manner. For example, 
the UN’s disinclination to engage with conservative religiosity amongst minority populations 
contrasts with government certainty that it is a foremost concern. These dissonant 
perspectives fit together awkwardly but have, nevertheless, each survived inside the PVE 
pivot in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz state is interested in deeper forms of governance over the 
rapidly morphing religious identity of ethnic minority citizens towards conservative forms of 
Islam while the Soviet-inspired secularism preferred by many elites and urbanites dwindles in 
influence. PVE initiatives may afford the national government opportunities to intervene in 
response to this religious shift. 
As another example, the ambiguity of the PVE approach allows the government to 
monitor and repress diversiform political resistance. The Kyrgyz government is mindful that 
the Kyrgyz population and its civil society have the potential to rapidly mobilize - protests 
have ousted presidents on two occasions already. According to some respondents, this history 
of mobilization rings in the ears of current authorities, who may be interested in avoiding the 
same fate by strategically suppressing political and civil resistance in the name of PVE. As a 
final example of the local allowances of PVE, the convenience of being able to select from a 
menu of explanations as to what drives violent extremism allows governments to downplay 
incriminating drivers such as the radicalizing effects of ethnic marginalization – enabling it to 
expand its control over political challengers even as it evades accountability to international 
organizations for human rights abuses therein. 
Reducing Local Resistance 
Strategically employed ambiguity shields the UN system from backlash against the 
inherent contradictions of the PVE approach to peacebuilding. As an example, the UN 
system’s rhetorical ambivalence to religion and religious actors, as indicated in the Plan of 
Action’s avoidance of references to Islam, illustrates the convenience of ambiguity. As 
mentioned earlier, Muslim-majority member states have reacted to perceptions that UN PVE 
is targeting Islam, and the UN system has worked hard to convince member states and other 
stakeholders that it is unbiased and not targeting any particular religion or creed.82 But it is 
certainly no secret that most UN PVE programming occurs in Muslim-majority countries 
anyways. Operating with minimal restraint despite this contradiction between official rhetoric 
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and practice is facilitated by strategic ambiguity – shielding the UN system from 
accountability and even close scrutiny in local contexts by securing the backing of national 
elites through elastic objectives.83 In addition, the UN is able to, when under pressure and 
facing potential resistance, rely upon ambiguous communication to local populations to 




This article has surveyed the contradictions that emerge when international 
organizations such as the UN transition to a PVE approach to peacebuilding. The primary 
conclusion of this research is that respondents who hold insider knowledge about the 
development of UN PVE projects characterized the UN’s pivot to PVE as an ambiguous 
affair. An original contribution of this research is detailing how this ambiguity is evident in 
the way UN respondents and their government counterparts conceive of both “radicalization” 
and “extremism” and in the way interveners have perpetuated a list of explanations for 
radicalization that are referenced and cherry-picked according to project and institutional 
requirements. 
Identifying the contradictions of ambiguity is significant in two ways. First, this 
research contributes to the scholarly and theoretical understanding of evolving UN 
peacebuilding practice beyond what is revealed in official UN strategy and policy documents. 
More specifically, through the construction of a grounded theory of the UN’s PVE approach, 
this article argues that the contradictions of ambiguity are overcome, perhaps ironically, by 
embracing the operational benefits of ambiguity. The ambiguity of PVE strategy is 
strategically tolerated and employed, whereby international actors bolster their influence by 
not clarifying the terms of engagement with national counterparts or with local populations 
and secure the necessary unity of purpose across multiple levels and actors to effectively 
implement the PVE turn. This grounded theory links into and adds to existing critical 
intervention literature by evidencing how the strategic use of ambiguity enhances external 
influence over peacebuilding interventions in complex environments through building 
operational support and allowing elite partner stakeholders the benefits of increased 
managerial latitude to satisfy their own self-interests. 
The recognition of the way ambiguous peacebuilding approaches can serve external 
and elite agendas points to a second area of significance. The lines of inquiry in this research 
critically inform the policies and practices of stakeholders at multiple levels by contributing 
to the current knowledge base that shapes PVE decision-making. Specifically, this research 
features the insight that despite rhetorical support in intervention policy for the idea of 
localized ownership and control,85 there exists a top-down strategic and operational bias in 
PVE implementation that promotes external agendas and, similarly, provides elite/national 
level stakeholders opportunities within PVE to pursue their own agendas – including the 
management of discordant local politics. In other words, the peacebuilding pivot to PVE may 
not break with typical self-interested modes of intervention but, rather, allows external 
interveners and their elite counterparts to craft even deeper forms of influence in conflict 
zones in service to self-interested agendas. Recognizing the elite-bias of the pivot towards a 
PVE approach is consequential for local populations and their civil societies in conflict zones 
and is, potentially, transformational. The empirical illumination herein of the biased top-
down dynamics of the PVE approach might induce conflict over clarity as lower level 
stakeholders insist upon reducing ambiguity through inclusive reflection upon the drivers of 
extremism in local contexts and increasingly open communication and deeper forms of 
accountability between international interveners and their elite-level counterparts and the 
local populations they serve. Overall, this significance is not restricted to the Kyrgyzstan case 
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– senior UN respondents in New York affirmed that the UN’s PVE approach in Kyrgyzstan 
reflects other cases around the globe. 
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